


AIRPROX REPORT No 2018034

Date: 06 Mar 2018 Time: 1408Z Position: 5212N 00221W Location: 5nm W Worcester

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	P68	PA28
Operator	Civ Comm	Civ Club
Airspace	London FIR	London FIR
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	Basic	Basic
Provider	London Info	Wellesbourne
Altitude/FL	2400ft	NK
Transponder	A, C, S	A, No Mode C
Reported		
Colours	White, blue	White, red
Lighting	Nav, tail strobe, taxi, landing	Nav, beacon
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	>10km	NK
Altitude/FL	2300ft	2000ft
Altimeter	QNH (987hPa)	NK
Heading	345°	090°
Speed	155kt	100kt
ACAS/TAS	Not fitted	Not fitted
Separation		
Reported	300ft V/0m H	400ft V/0m H
Recorded	NK V/<0.1nm H	



THE P68 PILOT reports being in straight-and-level cruise, heading to the SWB VOR (on about the 165 radial at 33nm) when a PA28 was seen to pass directly underneath in the opposite direction. The conflicting traffic was first seen through the perspex nose of the aircraft as it passed underneath the co-pilot’s pedals. By the time the conflicting traffic was seen, the threat was over and the flight was continued as normal.

He assessed the risk of collision as ‘High’.

THE PA28 PILOT reports conducting a local flight when he saw a high-wing twin-engine aircraft approaching from about the 2 o’clock position. It appeared to be about 400ft above and passed directly overhead about 2secs after first sighting. The pilot commented that it looked close but not so close that any action was required and that there wasn’t a major risk.

He assessed the risk of collision as ‘Low’.

THE LONDON INFORMATION FISO reports that he was made aware of a filed Airprox which occurred on 6th March 2018 at 1408. He confirmed that he was carrying out FISO duties at the time but had no recollection of the aircraft or event, and believed that no mention of the Airprox was made by the pilot on a London Information frequency.

Factual Background

The weather at Birmingham was recorded as follows:

METAR EGBB 061420Z 22005KT 180V290 9999 SCT024 BKN035 07/02 Q0987=

Analysis and Investigation

CAA ATSI

The Airprox was reported by the pilot of the P68 when he came into proximity with a PA28. Both pilots were operating under VFR.

At 1402:09 the P68 pilot requested a Basic Service from London Information, reporting that he was flying at 2300ft on the QNH 987hPa. London information instructed the pilot to squawk 1177 and, at 1404:28, asked the P68 pilot to confirm his route. At 1404:35 (Figure 1), the P68 pilot reported he was routing via the SWB at Shawbury and gave an estimate for his destination.




Figure 1 – 1404:35




Figure 2 - 1408:07

CPA occurred at 1408:07 (Figure 2), with an indicated horizontal separation of less than 0.1nm.

At the time of the Airprox the P68 pilot was in receipt of a Basic Service from London information. The PA28 pilot reported being in receipt of a Basic Service from Wellesbourne Mountford. London Information is a non-radar unit and they had received no radio contact or information on the PA28. As such they were not in a position to pass Traffic Information to the P68 pilot on the PA28.

UKAB Secretariat

The P68 and PA28 pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard¹. If the incident geometry is considered as converging then the PA28 pilot was required to give way to the P68².

Summary

An Airprox was reported when a P68 and a PA28 flew into proximity at 1408hrs on Tuesday 6th March 2018. Both pilots were operating under VFR in VMC in receipt of a Basic Service, the P68 pilot from London Information and the PA28 pilot from Wellesbourne Mountford.

¹ SERA.3205 Proximity.

² SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c)(2) Converging.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD’S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from both pilots, radar photographs/video recordings, a report from the FISO involved and a report from the appropriate ATC authority.

Members noted that with no TAS in either aircraft, and in the absence of a surveillance based FIS, when on converging courses the sole available barrier to mid-air collision consists of visual acquisition, either simply through lookout or as assisted by Traffic Information. Neither pilot elected to obtain a surveillance-based FIS, and members commented that perhaps Birmingham may have been able to provide a Traffic Service if requested. The Board agreed that although both pilots had seen the other aircraft, neither had done so in time to increase separation at CPA, effectively non-sightings. Although some members felt that safety had been much reduced, in the event, the aircraft were separated in altitude by about 400ft and the majority agreed that although safety had not been assured, there had been no risk of collision.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CAUSE AND RISK

Cause: Effectively a non-sighting by both pilots.

Degree of Risk: C.

Safety Barrier Assessment³

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

ANSP:


Situational Awareness and Action were assessed as **ineffective** because neither the London Information or Wellesbourne FISOs were surveillance equipped and the pilots were not operating with the same agency.

Flight Crew:

Situational Awareness and Action were assessed as **ineffective** because neither pilot was aware of the other aircraft until shortly before CPA.

Warning System Operation and Compliance were assessed as **not used** because neither aircraft was equipped with a TAS.

See and Avoid were assessed as **ineffective** because neither pilot saw the other aircraft in sufficient time to increase separation at CPA.



³ The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the [UKAB Website](#).